Reporting what happened in court is privileged; statements to the press may not be.See Jacobs v. Adelson, 130 Nev. 408, 414-17, 325 P.3d 1282, 1286-88 (2014)

Application of the absolute privilege in the media context
This court has not previously addressed whether the absolute privilege applies when the media is the recipient of the statement. We have, however, recognized that communications are not sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when they are made to someone without an interest in the outcome. See Fink, 118 Nev. at 436, 49 P.3d at 645-46.

The majority of states have determined that the absolute privilege does not apply when the communications are made to the media.2 “‘Communications made to newspapers and during press conferences have been almost universally found to be excluded from the protection of absolute privilege.'” Med. Informatics Eng’g, Inc. v. Orthopaedics Ne., P.C., 458 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Kenney, 379 N.J. Super. 118, 877 A.2d 277, 288 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2005)); see, e.g., Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 1979) (“Publication to the news media is not ordinarily sufficiently related to a judicial proceeding to constitute a privileged occasion.”); Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 688 P.2d 617, 622 (Ariz. 1984) (same); Rothman v. Jackson, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1134, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 294-95 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the absolute privilege generally should not be extended to “litigating in the press”); see also Milford Power Ltd. P’ship v. New England Power Co., 918 F. Supp. 471, 486 (D. Mass. 1996); Seidl v. Greentree Mortg. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1313-14 [*415] (D. Colo. 1998); Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 606 A.2d 693, 707 (Conn. 1992); Kennedy v. Zimmermann, 601 N.W.2d 61, 64-65 (Iowa 1999); Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (Md. 1962).

These courts have concluded that the policy considerations underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to statements made to the media. Statements made to the media “do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process in a judicial proceeding . . . . [They] do not generally encourage open and honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just the opposite.” Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 164 P.3d 366, 381 (Utah 2007). And allowing defamation claims for statements made to the media will not generally hinder investigations or the detailing of claims. Milford Power, 918 F. Supp. at 486; see also Asay, 594 F.2d at 698. Thus, the need for absolute privilege evaporates. Milford Power, 918 F. Supp. at 486. Because the privilege’s purpose is not [***10] to protect those making defamatory comments but “to lessen the chilling effect on those who seek to utilize the judicial process to seek relief,” these courts have declined to extend the privilege in this context. Kirschstein v. Haynes, 1990 OK 8, 788 P.2d 941, 952-53 (Okla. 1990).

Based on the policy considerations underlying the absolute privilege, we adopt [**1287] the majority view that statements made to the media are not subject to absolute privilege. Extension of the absolute privilege to cover statements to the media, when the media are not a party to the lawsuit or inextricably intertwined with the lawsuit, would not further the policy underlying the absolute privilege. This position is also in line with our previous caselaw acknowledging that the privilege was created in part because the public interest in free speech during litigation outweighs the possibility of abuse of the privilege through the making of false and malicious statements. See Cucinotta, 129 Nev. at 325, 302 P.3d at 1101; Circus Circus Hotels, 99 Nev. at 61, 657 P.2d at 104. However, protecting speech made during a judicial proceeding does not warrant allowing the dissemination of defamatory communications outside of the judicial proceedings. See Kelley, 606 A.2d at 707; Asay, 594 F.2d at 697.

Here, there has been no cogent argument that the Wall Street Journal has any other interest than that of an observer in the litigation [***11] such that the communications were made outside the judicial proceedings. While Adelson’s statements were connected to the litigation in that they addressed Jacobs’ contentions, we “draw the line between bona fide litigation activities and a public relations campaign” as it concerns the absolute privilege. Williams v. Kenney, 379 N.J. Super. 118, 877 A.2d 277, 290-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). The dissent argues that the extensive media coverage of the underlying judicial proceedings in this case has resulted in both the media and the [*416] public becoming “significantly interested” in the proceedings, thus triggering the absolute privilege to Adelson’s contested statements. We cannot agree.

As the dissent points out, we have previously determined that the absolute privilege only covers statements made to those without direct involvement in the judicial proceeding if the recipients of the communication are “significantly interested in the proceeding.” Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 436, 49 P.3d 640, 645-46 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).3 While we have yet to examine what constitutes a “significant interest” in judicial proceedings, drawing from our analysis in Fink, the policy underlying the absolute privilege, and other relevant caselaw, we conclude that assessing the significant interest of the recipient requires review of the [***12] recipient’s legal relationship to the litigation, not their interest as an observer. See id. at 436, 49 P.3d at 645-46; cf. Hall v. Smith, 214 Ariz. 309, 152 P.3d 1192, 1197 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that resolution of the judicial privilege issue pivots on relationship of recipient to the legal proceedings).

A nonparty recipient must have a relevant interest in, or a connection to, the outcome of the proceeding. See, e.g., Kanengiser v. Kanengiser, 248 N.J. Super. 318, 590 A.2d 1223, 1237 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (establishing that trustees and beneficiaries of a trust had a significant interest in potential litigation regarding the trust); DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453, 550 A.2d 163, 168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (indicating that nonparty recipient was significantly interested because the records sought in the litigation were relevant to the amount owed to the recipient and the recipient “could properly have been joined as a party”); cf. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that letter written by attorney was absolutely privileged because it was addressed to an attorney who represented a party with a financial interest in the proceeding, and copies were sent to individuals with direct financial interests in proceeding). Moreover, the [***13] nature of the recipient’s interest in or connection to the litigation is a “case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry” that must focus on and balance the underlying principles of the privilege. Hall, 152 P.3d at 1199.

Looking then at the relationship between the Wall Street Journal and the underlying district court proceedings in this case, we conclude that the newspaper does not have a direct interest in, or connection to, the outcome of the proceedings, other than as a [**1288] spectator. [*417] See Fink, 118 Nev. at 436, 49 P.3d at 646; Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 623; Hall, 152 P.3d at 1197. As explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Green Acres Trust v. London, generally, “reporter[s] play[] no role in the actual litigation other than that of a concerned observer.” 141 Ariz. 609, 688 P.2d 617, 623 (Ariz. 1984). Accordingly, we conclude that the Wall Street Journal does not have any legal or financial interest in the underlying litigation, and thus, it is not significantly interested in the litigation for purposes of the absolute privilege. Essentially, because Adelson’s statements were published to a disinterested party, they are not sufficiently connected to the judicial proceedings to warrant application of the absolute privilege.